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MINIMUM RESPONSIVENESS AND THE 
POLITICAL EXCLUSION OF THE POOR 
BERTRALL L. ROSS II*  
 TERRY SMITH** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Representative government is a principal feature of American democracy. 
The prevailing view is that a representative government is one that is responsive 
to the views and interests of the people.1 Scholars often define “the people” as a 
majority subset of the whole and measure the representativeness of government 
in terms of its responsiveness to the interests of the majority of the electorate.2 
Supreme Court doctrine has been seen as following this prevailing view by 
establishing a “one person, one vote” requirement that is explained as 
prioritizing majority rule to the exclusion of other law-of-democracy values.3 
But there is an alternative, richer account of representative government and 
responsiveness that incorporates additional values beyond simple adherence to 
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 1. See HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209 (1967) (“Representing . . . 
means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them.”); KENNY J. WHITBY, 
THE COLOR OF REPRESENTATION: CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BLACK INTERESTS 5 (1997) 
(contending that the main component of substantive representation is policy responsiveness); Guy-
Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive 
Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1149 (2002) (“Responsiveness is the linchpin of 
democratic governance and the sine qua non of a representative democracy.”). Even the debate 
between descriptive and substantive representation is about how to best secure a more responsive 
government. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
44–45 (1958) (arguing in favor of inclusion of descriptive members of all classes into the government 
because of the danger that the interests of the excluded will be overlooked and “seen with very 
different eyes from those of the person whom it directly concerns”); MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, 
TRUST, AND MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION 
3 (1998) (linking descriptive representation to responsiveness to “the distinctive political interests” of 
marginalized groups). 
 2. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF 
TRENDS IN AMERICANS’ POLICY PREFERENCES 2 (1992) (describing studies that show that the 
government does adequately on this measure of representativeness). 
 3. See infra text and accompanying note 102. 
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majority rule. According to this account, “the people” should also be 
understood in a disaggregated sense as individuals—and particularly groups of 
individuals—with shared interests and experiences. Since there is no monolithic 
majority of people with shared interests, but instead shifting majorities based on 
combinations of various minority interests,4 a government is representative if it 
is open to the consideration of all interests and preferences existent in society, 
with equal consideration serving as the ideal.5 Under this view, responsiveness 
cannot be measured simply as the degree to which government policy tracks 
majority preferences, but must also take into account the consideration given to 
minority group views. 
Consideration is a rather amorphous concept, but we define it as the process 
by which minority group interests are heard by elected actors in the political 
process. It is only on the basis of consideration, and the process of bargaining 
and compromise within the political process, that minority interests can evolve 
into majoritarian public policy. Lack of consideration of minority group 
interests within the political process is problematic because when a particular 
minority group’s interests are overlooked—whether it is because one party 
takes for granted the group’s support or neither party seeks the group’s support 
for fear of alienating median-swing voters—there are systemic democratic 
consequences. In particular, to the extent that a group and its interests are 
excluded from consideration, the members of the group are less likely to vote or 
participate in the democratic process, and, equally important, democratic 
government has failed in its principal objective of being representative. 
We argue that overlooked Supreme Court doctrine in the area of voting 
rights takes heed of this concern and seeks to ensure that the political process 
provides fair consideration of minority group interests. In this article we 
propose a new paradigm for understanding the Court’s view of the 
constitutional and democratic requirements for representative government, 
which we term minimum responsiveness. 
To understand the minimum responsiveness doctrine properly, it is 
necessary to situate it within the Court’s broader jurisprudence on the law of 
democracy. Too frequently, it has been assumed that the marginalization of 
minority group interests must be addressed via antidiscrimination principles.6 
However, by nesting the principles underlying representative government in 
antidiscrimination doctrine, its applicability would be limited unnecessarily to 
suspect classes. The minimum responsiveness standard instead has a doctrinal 
 
 4. See V. O. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 207 (1947) (explaining that given 
the differentiation in American society, it is difficult for any single interest group to constitute a 
majority and govern and “[a] combination of interests is necessary to win elections and to govern”); see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 5. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
GILDED AGE 252 (2008) (“One of the most basic principles of democracy is the notion that every 
citizen’s preferences should count equally in the realm of politics and government.”). 
 6. Contra Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 44–45 (1976) (placing the cases establishing this standard within the antidiscrimination paradigm). 
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home in the Court’s burgeoning jurisprudence on the law of democracy and, as 
a result, its applicability is not dependent on the prescriptions of 
antidiscrimination doctrine. The requirement that there be a minimum level of 
responsiveness is therefore applicable not only to politically marginalized racial 
and gender groups, but also to groups such as the poor that fall outside of 
antidiscrimination discourse. 
We flesh out this new paradigm by offering a case study of the minimum 
responsiveness standard and its applicability to the poor. In part II, we argue 
that defects in the political process are a source of nonresponsiveness to the 
interests of politically marginalized groups. In particular, in the American two-
party competition model, both parties have incentives to appeal to median-
swing voters at the expense of marginalized group interests. In part III, we offer 
examples of this defect in the political process by describing the divergence in 
responsiveness to southern Blacks and the poor by the Democratic Party and 
the lack of responsiveness by the Republican Party to these two groups over the 
last forty years. We do this both anecdotally, by examining the parties’ support 
for major legislation consistent with the interests of these groups, and 
empirically, through social-science studies showing changes in responsiveness to 
these groups over time. We argue from this evidence that in the current political 
context, the poor should be considered a politically excluded group, to which 
neither of the political parties is responsive. In part IV, we describe the Court’s 
development of a minimum responsiveness standard and argue for the 
standard’s applicability to politically excluded groups such as the poor. As part 
of this discussion, we show that this standard is appropriately located within the 
Court’s law-of-democracy jurisprudence. In part V, we offer brief suggestions 
for changes in democratic organizational structures that would provide one or 
both of the parties with incentives to become, at the very least, minimally 
responsive to the poor. 
II 
SOURCES OF NONRESPONSIVENESS TO MARGINALIZED GROUP INTERESTS 
The sources of nonresponsiveness to marginalized group interests cannot be 
understood without reference to political parties.7 Parties are an integral part of 
the process of creating representative government. Through their competition 
for the support of various groups and interests in order to win elections,8 parties 
 
 7. See Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1608 (1999) 
(“[T]he central fact of democratic politics . . . is that individual participation can be meaningful only 
when mediated through organizational forms,” such as political parties.). 
 8. This prevailing view of parties is contrary to the classical view held by Edmund Burke, who 
conceived of parties as “a body of men united, for promulgating by their joint endeavors the national 
interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.” MARC J. HETERINGTON & 
WILLIAM J. KEEFE, PARTIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA 1 (2007) (quoting EDMUND 
BURKE, WORKS, vol. 1, 375 (1897)). Most scholars agree that this does not accurately describe the two 
major political parties in the United States. See id. at 2. 
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are central to any democratic government because they are the essential 
instrument through which varied interests are considered, and thus represented, 
in the political process.9 The conventional view is that two-party competition 
will result in the inclusion and mobilization of all interests and groups because 
every vote is needed to secure a majority and ultimate control of the governing 
apparatus.10 Even though one party must lose in any election, the interests of the 
losing minority are still represented in the political process by an opposition 
that can bargain with the majority and could later emerge as the governing 
party. 
Consistent with this view is the orthodoxy that lack of political participation 
by a politically marginalized group leads to the parties’ lack of responsiveness 
to that group’s interests. Since the competitive political market requires that the 
two parties compete for all voters in order to put together a majority coalition, a 
lack of responsiveness to a particular group by both political parties can occur 
only when that group of voters chooses not to participate. V. O. Key famously 
expressed this view of nonresponsiveness when he stated, “The blunt truth is 
that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to 
classes and groups of citizens that do not vote.”11 Within this perspective lies the 
argument that there is little that courts and legislatures can do to address 
nonresponsiveness to marginalized group interests except remove barriers to 
participation such as registration requirements and voter identification laws.12 
Paul Frymer has recently challenged the conventional view that party 
competition leads to inclusive parties and inclusive government.13 He argues 
that the system of two-party competition creates incentives for parties to appeal 
to “median, ‘swing’ voters.”14 In order to capture the majority needed to win 
elections, he contends, centrist voters are pivotal; therefore, to the extent that 
peripheral group interests conflict with those in the center, neither party will 
 
 9. See E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1, 62 (1970) (describing political parties 
as the creator of democracy and modern democracy as being “unthinkable save in terms of the parties” 
because of their role in securing representative government that considers the interests of a multitude 
of people); Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote—One Vote, One 
Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 52 (“To mobilize a majority of the votes in an election, each political party 
must appeal to a variety of ‘interests’ and a wide spectrum of opinion.”). 
 10. See, e.g., HETERINGTON & KEEFE, supra note 8, at 39 (2007) (describing the conventional view 
of parties as inclusive of all elements in society). 
 11. KEY, supra note 4, at 527; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Participation and Hope, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1761, 1767 (1998) (“If you don’t participate, you can be pretty sure that public officers aren’t 
paying attention to you.”). 
 12. See FRANCIS FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON’T VOTE 17 
(1988) (viewing registration barriers as the biggest impediment to voting); RAYMOND WOLFINGER & 
STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 61–62 (1980). 
 13. PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES: RACE AND PARTY COMPETITION IN AMERICA 6–7 
(1999) (challenging the conventional assumption of parties as inherently inclusive). His argument draws 
from the median voter theory famously promulgated by Anthony Downs. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114–22 (1985). 
 14. FRYMER, supra note 13, at 8. 
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seek to appeal to these interests for fear of losing elections.15 Frymer describes 
this dynamic in the context of capture, in which an ideologically peripheral 
group (Blacks) that overwhelmingly votes for one party (the Democratic Party) 
is taken for granted by that party while it appeals to median voters (moderate-
to-conservative white voters).16 But “captured” minorities are not the only 
groups underserved by a two-party system. Frymer overlooks the fact that this 
dynamic also results in exclusion, in which an ideologically peripheral group is 
ignored by both parties because of the perceived cost of inclusion in terms of 
interest-based conflict with median voters. 
This party nonresponsiveness resulting from exclusion ultimately affects 
participation by members of politically marginalized groups.17 As E. E. 
Schattschneider argued, “[a]bstention reflects the suppression of the options 
and alternatives that reflect the needs of the nonparticipants.”18 In other words, 
contrary to Key’s account, it is nonresponsiveness that causes lack of 
participation; members of groups on the periphery abstain because they 
perceive no differences between the parties in terms of responsiveness to their 
interests.19 
A recent shift in the political science literature on the causes of lack of 
political participation seems to provide further support for the view that lack of 
responsiveness to marginalized groups’ interests is caused by something more 
than lack of participation by members of that particular group. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the prevailing view in political science was that resources—particularly 
education and to a lesser extent income—were positively correlated with 
 
 15. Frymer was not the first political scientist to identify the tendency of parties to appeal to the 
center at the exclusion of the interests of individuals on the periphery. E.E. Schattschneider identified 
in a different era the tendency of the two parties to compete for sixty percent of the electorate that 
voted while ignoring the forty percent on the periphery that did not. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE 
SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 97–113 (1960). 
 16. FRYMER supra note 13, at 7–10 (describing the process of capture and providing an example of 
Blacks overwhelmingly voting for the Democratic Party, which takes them for granted and instead 
appeals to moderate-to-conservative white voters). Professor Terry Smith has described the racially 
disparate impact of the median voter model: 
The median voter model is inherently inconsistent with [a] view of race as a defining issue 
because the median voter—who is white—is strongly skewed to one side of the political 
continuum on the race question, while black voters are strongly skewed to the opposite 
extreme. Moreover, even if the gap between black and white perspectives on issues of race is 
overstated, the racial harm of the median voter theory lies as much in the common perception 
among political leaders that the median voter does not support black interests as it does in 
parties’ efforts to cater to the reality of the white median voter’s beliefs about race. 
Terry Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 845, 852 (2000). These racial 
harms are analogous to the harms that inure to the poor when they are shut out of the process of party 
coalition-building. 
 17. DOWNS, supra note 13, at 39 (explaining that when a voter perceives the difference between his 
expected utility incomes from voting for one party as opposed to voting for another to be zero, he 
abstains). 
 18. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 105. 
 19. In other words, the expected benefits from voting are exceeded by the costs. DOWNS, supra 
note 13, at 39. 
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voting.20 This “resource model of participation” thus attributed individual 
decisions to participate to personal characteristics and the so-called costs of 
voting in terms of time, money, and knowledge. This model, which was 
consistent with the conventional account that lack of participation leads to lack 
of responsiveness, attributed the nonparticipation of the poor to their lack of 
resources as opposed to the lack of responsiveness by the parties and elected 
officials. 
This consensus in favor of the resource model of participation began to 
break down because of the inability to account for the paradoxical trend that as 
average Americans were becoming more educated over time their willingness 
to vote had declined.21 Mobilization theorists found a solution to this paradox by 
examining the benefits side of voting.22 They found that “people who see more 
at stake in politics, whether because policies affect them more, identities beckon 
them more, options appeal to them more, or duty calls them more, are more 
attracted by the many benefits that politics offers.”23 Political parties play an 
important role in creating these benefits to voting by mobilizing individuals and 
groups—contacting voters and urging them to vote for a particular candidate on 
the basis of shared interests—and it is the choice of political parties to focus 
these mobilization efforts on middle- and upper-class individuals that has led 
marginalized groups, like the poor, to abstain from voting.24 
A more recent empirical study by some of the original proponents of the 
resource model of participation provides further support for mobilization 
theory.25 This study, which includes the previously omitted variable “political 
interest” in its empirical model, found that it, not education or income, has the 
most substantial impact on participation.26 Political interest is associated more 
with the benefits side of voting and is primarily generated through the 
mobilization efforts of political parties to attract voters. Thus, mobilization 
theory supports the argument that it is the lack of responsiveness—through 
public policy promulgated by legislators while in office and mobilization efforts 
during campaign season—that results in lack of participation.  The sources of 
 
 20. WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 12, at 24 (finding that education has the most 
powerful independent effect on turnout); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN 
AMERICA 13 (1972) (finding that job, education, and income are determinants of political 
participation). 
 21. Richard A. Brody, The Puzzle of Participation in America, in THE NEW AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 287 (Anthony King ed., 1978). 
 22. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 5 (1993) (“People participate in politics not so much because of who they 
are but because of the political choices and incentives they are offered.”). 
 23. Id. at 6. 
 24. Id. at 213 (“[C]hanging patterns of mobilization by parties, campaigns, and social movements 
account for at least half of the decline in electoral participation since the 1960s.”). 
 25. Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, & Kay Lehman Schlozman, Beyond SES: A Resource Model of 
Political Participation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271 (1995). 
 26. Id. at 283. 
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responsiveness bias therefore must be found elsewhere such as within the 
incentives structures of the two-party system. 
Vulnerable groups, such as Blacks27 and the poor,28 have historically been 
most in danger of having their interests excluded from the political process as a 
result of the defects within the incentive structure of the two-party system.29 A 
history of discrimination and political marginalization has left these two groups 
without representation in the political process at different periods of time.30 
During the past forty years, however, the political fortunes of these two groups 
have diverged dramatically. Blacks, particularly those who live in the South, 
have emerged from a state of political exclusion to one of political inclusion. 
Prior to 1970, the southern wing of the Democratic Party, which had historically 
dominated southern politics, consistently ignored Blacks’ interests; today, 
however, that same party is dependent on their support for election.31 At the 
same time, the poor, who were once the putative beneficiaries of the 
Democratic Party’s “war on poverty” in the 1960s, have become increasingly 
politically invisible as Democrats seek the support of the middle class at the 
expense of policies favorable to the poor. In addition, the Republican Party 
during this period has shown little interest in incorporating the poor into its 
electoral coalition.32 As a result, the poor are in a state of political exclusion not 
unlike the position of southern Blacks before the 1970s: their interests and 
needs are rarely considered in the political process. In response, the poor, for 
the most part, abstain from voting.33 Like the political exclusion of southern 
 
 27. Blacks are obviously included among the poor. Although this overlap may present complexities 
requiring a more granular analysis in a different context, it does not for present purposes. In this article, 
we seek only to identify a constitutional floor for representation below which neither group may fall. 
 28. The poor are usually described as those living below the official federal poverty line. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
2006 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf. As local efforts to raise the 
poverty line upward demonstrate, this metric is underinclusive. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV & PETER 
GERMANIS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND WELFARE REFORM ACADEMY, RECONSIDERING THE 
FEDERAL POVERTY MEASURE (2004), available at http://www.welfareacademy.org/pubs/poverty/ 
povmeasure.description.pdf. Moreover, because the poor are not a static subset of the population—
families and individuals move in and out of poverty over time—the descriptor paints as aberrational 
something that is much more common than widely appreciated. Mark R. Rank, Toward a New 
Understanding of American Poverty, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 32–35 (2006). Finally, while 
household incomes may lift families above poverty status, individual workers’ wages in the United 
States are astonishingly low. David Cay Johnston, Joe the Plumber’s Taxes, 121 TAX NOTES 471 (2008) 
(finding that more than half of all workers had an annual salary of less than $25,000 in 2007). 
 29. See infra III. 
 30. See infra III. 
 31. See infra III. 
 32. The Republican Party has appealed to voters in these groups on the basis of shared social 
values, like abortion and gay marriage. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?: 
HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA 67–77 (2005). While this is an important step, 
the unwillingness to appeal to interests distinct to these groups, such as civil rights and social welfare, 
acts as a continued impediment to inclusiveness. See infra III. 
 33. In the 2004 presidential election, less than forty percent of the poor reported voting, the lowest 
percentage of any income class. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE 
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Blacks prior to the 1970s, the current political exclusion of the poor raises 
important concerns about the representativeness of American democracy. 
III 
THE DIVERGENCE IN PARTY RESPONSIVENESS TO SOUTHERN BLACKS AND 
THE POOR 
During his 1964 State of the Union Address, President Lyndon Johnson 
declared a “war on poverty.”34 As part of this war, the Democratic-controlled 
Congress enacted legislation over the next four years that established social-
welfare programs targeting the structural sources of poverty including 
inadequate jobs, health, and education, as well as programs targeting the 
immediate needs of the poor. Addressing the structural sources of poverty, 
Congress enacted the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964, which established 
Community Action Programs that empowered the poor by incorporating them 
into local committees responsible for designing and administering antipoverty 
programs and services, such as job training.35 The next year, Congress passed the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which increased federal spending on 
education and focused this spending on educationally disadvantaged children 
living in impoverished areas.36 It also amended the Social Security Act to 
establish Medicare, a federal health-insurance program for the elderly, and 
Medicaid, a federal health-insurance program for the poor.37 In addition to this 
legislation focused on addressing the structural sources of poverty, Congress 
targeted the immediate needs of the poor by making permanent the Food 
Stamp Program, which appropriated money to address the nutritional needs of 
the poor, and by increasing the minimum wage to the highest real-value level in 
its history.38 
 
ELECTION OF 2004 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/ 
voting/cps2004.html. 
 34. In his address, President Johnson described the broad goals of the war on poverty: 
The war on poverty is not a struggle simply to support people, to make them dependent on 
the generosity of others. It is a struggle to give people a chance. It is an effort to allow them to 
develop and use their capacities, as we have been allowed to use ours, so that they can share, 
as others share, in the promise of this nation. . . . It strikes at the causes, not just the 
consequences of poverty. 
Bernard R. Gifford, War on Poverty: Assumptions, History, and Results, a Flawed but Important Effort, 
in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND ITS LEGACY: TWENTY YEARS OF SOCIAL POLICY 60, 63 (Marshall 
Kaplan & Peggy L. Cuciti eds., 1986). 
 35. SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY’S POOR LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY ix 
(1969). 
 36. Patrick McGuinn & Frederick Hess, Freedom from Ignorance: Great Society and the Evolution 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF 
LIBERALISM 289, 297–98 (F. Piven & R. Cloward eds., 2005). 
 37. Edward Berkowitz, Medicare, The Great Society’s Enduring National Health Insurance 
Program, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 320, 320 (F. Piven & R. 
Cloward eds., 2005). 
 38. BARTELS, supra note 5, at 226. 
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Measuring responsiveness in terms of the crude measure of passage of major 
legislation, the war on poverty represented an explosion in Democratic Party 
responsiveness to the poor that had not been seen since the Great Depression. 
This increased responsiveness was driven in part by moral considerations and 
the influence of intellectuals such as Michael Harrington, whose book The 
Other America: Poverty in the United States poignantly described the extent of 
poverty and led to a parade of commentary on the issue.39 Political 
considerations also played an important role. Presidents John F. Kennedy and 
Johnson approached the antipoverty program with an eye towards maintaining 
the poor, which comprised nearly twenty percent of the national population in 
1964, as part of the Democratic Party’s electoral coalition that had prevailed 
since the New Deal.40 This proved to be especially important in light of the 
defection of many southern Whites from the Democratic Party as a result of the 
national party’s promotion of a civil-rights agenda favorable to Blacks.41 In total, 
the Democratic Party, with the exception of southern Democrats, who viewed 
legislation like the Economic Opportunity Act as disproportionately benefiting 
Blacks,42 overwhelmingly supported the “war on poverty” legislation, while the 
Republican Party, consistent with its historical leaning since the New Deal 
towards the more affluent classes, expressed lukewarm support for these 
programs.43 
In contrast to the national Democratic Party’s efforts to incorporate the 
poor into its electoral coalition, the southern wing of the Democratic Party in 
the one-party-dominated South continued to resist the growing influence of 
Blacks that flowed from the dramatic increase in registration and voting 
stimulated by the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965.44 Southern Democratic 
candidates continued to seek the support of white voters who saw growing 
 
 39. Gifford, supra note 34, at 61. 
 40. See, e.g., JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 130 (2000) (describing President Kennedy’s efforts to keep poor voters in the 
Democratic electoral coalition through the creation of antipoverty programs). 
 41. See Merle Black, The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party, 66 J. POL. 1001, 1010 
(2004) (describing the devastating combination of racial and economic liberalism required to maintain 
southern white support). The efforts to maintain the New Deal Coalition ultimately proved 
unsuccessful as racial animosity proved central to white southerners’ exodus. Kevin Phillips estimates 
that the civil rights program probably accounted for between one third and one half of white 
southerners’ flight to the Republican Party. KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERILS 
AND POLITICS OF RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 180 
(2006). 
 42. See LAWSON BOWLING, SHAPERS OF THE GREAT DEBATE ON THE GREAT SOCIETY 105 
(2005). 
 43. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974 538–40 
(1996). 
 44. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 264 (2000) (noting that approximately a million new voters were 
registered in the South within a few years after the Act was passed). 
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black political power as a threat.45 On the basis of this support, three 
segregationist governors were elected to office in the late 1960s.46 In addition, a 
majority of southern Democratic congressmen catered to this constituency 
when they voted against the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the reauthorization 
of the VRA in 1970.47 For those few white elected officials who were responsive 
to the interests of black voters through their support for civil rights legislation, 
such responsiveness often proved costly; for example, of the five Democratic 
southern congressmen who voted in favor of the VRA in 1965, four lost their 
seats in the 1966 election.48 Again, measuring responsiveness in terms of support 
for major legislation, Blacks in the South remained an excluded political 
minority through the early 1970s. 
Over the next forty years, the position of Blacks evolved from that of a 
politically excluded group to which most southern Democratic elected officials 
proved unresponsive, to one in which the Democratic Party proved to be 
greatly responsive.  By 2000, Blacks comprised approximately forty percent of 
Democratic voters in the South.49 Along with these advances in black political 
participation came an increase in responsiveness to black interests by 
Democratic Party elected officials.50 As an example of this increased 
responsiveness, over ninety percent of southern Democratic members of 
Congress supported the Voting Rights Amendment Act of 1982 and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991,51 while the Voting Rights Act of 2006 received unanimous 
support. Although this increase in responsiveness by the Democratic Party has 
been impressive, it is important not to overstate the political progress of Blacks 
in the South.52 The exodus of many Whites from the Democratic Party has led to 
the hegemony of a Republican Party in the South that fails to consider black 
interests in much the same way that the Democratic Party had failed to forty 
years earlier. 
For the poor, the war on poverty in the 1960s and early 1970s evolved into a 
war on the poor in the 1980s and 1990s. Conservative economic policies and 
 
 45. In the period after the passage of the VRA in 1965, the perceived threat of growing black 
political power amongst white constituents and elected officials can be inferred from the fact that 
representatives of political jurisdictions with high black populations were less responsive to the 
interests of Blacks than elected officials in political jurisdictions with relatively low black populations. 
See Charles Bullock & Susan A. MacManus, Policy Responsiveness to the Black Electorate: 
Programmatic Versus Symbolic Representation, 9 AM. POL. Q. 357, 365 (1981); Merle Black, Racial 
Composition of Congressional Districts and Support for Federal Voting Rights in the American South, 59 
SOC. SCI. Q. 435, 443 (1978). 
 46. Black, supra note 45, at 444. 
 47. Id. at 443–44. 
 48. Id. at 444. 
 49. See Black, supra note 41, at 1011. 
 50. Id. at 1002 (describing the shift of the Democratic Party from “[t]he party of white supremacy” 
to “the party of racial inclusion and ethnic diversity”). 
 51. WHITBY, supra note 1, at 32, 65. 
 52. It is also important to note that the comparisons between responsiveness to Blacks and the 
poor are relative; the authors do not contend that the VRA or any other legal tool has adequately 
remedied the problem of electoral capture as it applies to Blacks. 
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political rhetoric combined with virtual abandonment by the Democratic Party 
resulted in the poor being both economically more vulnerable and politically 
more impotent. Republican Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan 
eliminated many of the “war on poverty” programs and cut spending on 
antipoverty measures.53 With the exception of an evolving state health-insurance 
program for children living in poverty,54 there has been little in terms of 
antipoverty legislation since the establishment of the relatively successful 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in 1972. Even the success of the EITC, 
which provides tax credits to the working poor, has been offset by the declining 
real value of the minimum wage.55 The decreased spending and lack of 
legislation responsive to the interests and needs of the poor over the past forty 
years has continued in spite of the fact that 12.5 % of Americans continue to 
live below the poverty line, 56 a measure that some argue understates the current 
levels of poverty.57 This is exactly the same percentage that lived below the 
poverty line in 197158 when American support for the war on poverty began to 
wane. 
The success of the conservative strategy of racialization and personalization 
of poverty contributed importantly to the political marginalization of the poor. 
Conservatives employed stories about “welfare queens,” who were described as 
“black wom[e]n with a long-term addiction to the dole and a willingness to use 
childbirth as a way to prolong and increase [their] welfare check[s].”59 Many 
Americans were influenced by this type of rhetoric and adopted stereotypes of 
the poor as black (even though most were not), undeserving, and lacking in 
morals, values, and work ethic.60 This shift from a view of poverty as driven by 
structural defects in the economic system to poverty as driven by race and 
personal defects in the individual also led many Americans to believe that 
government had a limited role in alleviating the problem.61 
 
 53. See Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The Politics of the Great Society, in THE GREAT 
SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 253, 264–65 (Sidney Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 
2005). 
 54. For a description of state health-insurance programs for low-income children, see JOEL 
HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 122–
28 (2007). 
 55. BARTELS, supra note 5, at 246. 
 56. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY STATUS OF PEOPLE BY FAMILY RELATIONSHIP, RACE, AND 
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1959 TO 2007 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/ 
histpov/perindex.html. 
 57. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 54, at 23. 
 58. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 56. 
 59. Joe Soss et al., Setting the Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolution 
Revolution, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 378, 390 (2001). 
 60. See William JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 13–18 (1987) (describing the growing influence of this conservative 
perspective in the 1980s). 
 61. Id. at 6–18 (describing and assessing the effects of the shifting views of poverty and the poor). 
ROSS II SMITH 5/1/2010 10:33:15 AM 
208 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:197 
As a result of this shift, the Democratic Party has over the last twenty years 
largely abandoned the poor as part of its effort to bring middle-class whites, the 
median-swing voters in recent elections, back into its electoral coalition. This 
abandonment was best symbolized by President Bill Clinton’s support for the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 that 
garnered about half the votes of congressional Democrats.62 This Act 
transferred responsibility over welfare programs to the states and imposed stiff 
new work requirements without addressing the structural deficiencies in the 
low-wage labor market or the inadequate education and job training of the 
poor. The Act also limited lifetime eligibility for the receipt of aid to five years.63 
By 2004, promises of programs and legislation appealing to the interests of 
the middle class dominated the Democratic Party platform, and the only 
measures directed to the poor were support for an increase in the minimum 
wage and the EITC.  These policies, which were low on the Democratic agenda, 
merely serve as Band-Aids to the problems of poverty.64 In 2008, Senator 
Barack Obama’s presidential campaign focused on putting America’s “middle 
class first.”65 The poor seemed to be a distant second for Obama,66 who along 
with Republican opponent Senator John McCain, rarely addressed their 
interests on the campaign trail and proposed few new policies that would 
specifically target the poor.67 Consequently, from the perspective of policy 
responsiveness in the form of favorable legislation, the poor seemed to have 
become politically invisible. The Democratic Party has recently paid very little 
 
 62. In the Senate, seventeen Democrats voted in favor of the Act, thirteen opposed; in the House, 
seventy voted in favor of the Act and seventy-seven opposed. All but two Republicans in Congress, 
both in the House, supported the bill. 
 63. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 54, at 1. 
 64. Strong at Home, Respected in the World, The 2004 Democratic National Platform for America 
(July 27, 2004), available at www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf. 
 65. See, e.g., Senator Barack Obama, Prepared Remarks for Obama’s Event in Dover, New 
Hampshire, THE PAGE, Sept. 12, 2008, available at http://thepage.time.com/prepared-remarks-for-
obamas-event-in-dover-new-hampshire/ (describing how if he were elected he would be a President 
that put the “middle class first” and outlining a set of campaign promises directed towards this group of 
people). 
 66. The importance of the middle class was further demonstrated by the Obama Administration’s 
establishment of a middle-class task force led by Vice President-elect Joseph Biden and including four 
prospective cabinet members as well as presidential advisers. Biden to Run Middle Class Task Force, 
CBS NEWS, Dec. 21, 2008, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/21/ 
politics/main4680733.shtml (last visited July 7, 2009). The task force is designed to “ensure the middle 
class is ‘no longer being left behind.’” Id. 
 67. Although the 2008 Democratic Party platform described poverty as a “national priority,” the 
only specific policies proposed were those that have essentially become boilerplate components of prior 
Democratic platforms, including expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, raising the minimum 
wage, and indexing it to inflation. See Renewing America’s Promise, The 2008 Democratic National 
Platform available at http://www.democrats.org/a/party/platform.html. The only two discussions of the 
poor and poverty in the Republican Party platform involved poverty abroad and poverty associated 
with single-parent families. See 2008 Republican Platform available at http:// 
platform.gop.com/2008Platform.pdf. No specific policies were proposed to address the economic needs 
and interests of the domestic poor. Id. 
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attention to the interests and needs of the poor and the Republican Party has 
done little to fill the responsiveness deficit. 
The account of divergence in the inclusion of southern Blacks into the 
political process through increasing Democratic party responsiveness and the 
exclusion of the poor from the political process through increasing Democratic 
Party neglect over the past forty years is supported by empirical studies drawn 
from the social sciences. A study of responsiveness prior to, and immediately 
after, the enactment of the VRA showed somewhat paradoxically that the more 
Blacks there were in a particular district, the less likely that white Democratic 
elected official representing that district would support legislation favorable to 
Blacks.68 By the mid-1970s, this inverse relationship had been replaced by a 
positive relationship between the proportion of Blacks in a district and the 
responsiveness of political actors to black interests.69 The VRA, which not only 
increased voting by southern Blacks but also led to the creation of districts in 
which Blacks constituted a majority, has been an important source of increased 
responsiveness by southern Democrats as a whole.70 By the mid-1980s, southern 
Democrats were just as liberal as nonsouthern Democrats in their voting 
pattern on civil rights issues; the responsiveness bias favoring southern Whites 
over Blacks had virtually disappeared.71 
For the poor, the account of interest group exclusion based on the lack of 
favorable legislation and policies over the past forty years also finds support in 
the empirical studies. The one study to examine responsiveness bias in the 1970s 
 
 68. See Black, supra note 45, at 443 (describing this inverse relationship in the roll-call votes of 
members of Congress for the Voting Rights Act in 1965). This pattern of roll-call voting is consistent 
with what V. O. Key famously described as the threat hypothesis, which claims that the more Blacks 
there are in a district, the more whites perceive a threat to their hegemony and the greater their 
hostility to Blacks. V. O. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5–10 (1949). 
 69. Early studies showed a curvilinear relationship between the proportion of Blacks in a district 
and responsiveness of elected officials; responsiveness increased linearly up to a point at which Blacks 
comprised approximately twenty-five percent of the electorate, decreased up to a point at which Blacks 
made up thirty-five percent of the electorate, and then again increased linearly. Black, supra note 45, at 
445; Charles S. Bullock, Congressional Voting and the Mobilization of a Black Electorate in the South, 
43 J. POL. 662, 670 (1981). A subsequent study found that the differences in responsiveness and 
increased conservatism of districts with approximately thirty-percent black population had to do with 
the rural character of these districts. Michael W. Combs et al., Black Constituents and Congressional 
Roll Call Votes, 37 W. POL. Q. 424, 430 (1984). Later empirical studies introduced an interaction black-
urban variable into their regressions and found a linear relationship in urban districts between the 
proportion of Blacks and responsiveness. Kenny Whitby, Measuring Congressional Responsiveness to 
the Policy Interests of Black Constituents, 68 SOC. SCI. Q. 367, 374 (1987). The most recent empirical 
studies have shown a linear relationship without the introduction of this interactive term. Mary 
Herring, Legislative Responsiveness to Black Constituents in Three Deep South States, 52 J. POL. 740, 
752 (1990); Vincent L. Hutchings, Issue Salience and Support for Civil Rights Legislation Among 
Southern Democrats, 23 LEG. STUD. Q. 521, 522 (1998). 
 70. See Charles S. Bullock, The Impact of Changing the Racial Composition of Congressional 
Districts on Legislators’ Roll Call Behavior, 23 AMER. POL. SCI. Q. 141, 148 (1995) (demonstrating that 
aggressive drawing of majority-black districts in the 1990 round of redistricting increased 
responsiveness). 
 71. Kenny J. Whitby & Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., A Longitudinal Analysis of Competing 
Explanations for the Transformation of Southern Congressional Politics, 53 J. POL. 504, 510 (1991). 
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found that “the vast majority of cities exhibit[ed] higher levels of responsiveness 
to high-income citizens and whites than to low-income citizens and blacks.”72 
Thus, early evidence indicated the ephemeral nature of the increased 
responsiveness of elected officials during the war on poverty.73 A more recent 
study examined public opinion polls on major changes in U.S. policy from 1981 
to 2002. It found that on issues in which the rich and the poor disagree, the 
policy outcomes were strongly related to the preferences of the rich and 
“wholly unrelated to the preferences of the poor.”74 In a similarly troubling 
study, Larry Bartels examined the voting patterns and specific roll-call votes of 
U.S. senators in the late 1980s and early 1990s and found that on bills involving 
minimum wage, civil rights, government spending, and abortion, “the views of 
low-income constituents had no discernible impact on the voting behavior of 
their senators.”75 The consistency with which the preferences of the poor were 
not adhered to by the senators strongly supports an inference that their 
interests were not even incorporated into the interest-bargaining and 
compromises of the political process. As further support for this inference, 
Bartels found that the poor were not only politically irrelevant to Republican 
senators, but also to Democratic senators, who were found to have paid no 
attention to the views of the poor.76 The poor, at least according to these 
empirical studies, have essentially become an excluded group in the political 
process. 
Both accounts of the sources of lack of responsiveness to marginalized 
group interests—lack of participation and defects in the political process—
provide plausible explanations for this divergence in responsiveness between 
southern Blacks and the poor that are not mutually exclusive. According to the 
conventional account that attributes lack of responsiveness to lack of 
participation, political officials have become responsive to southern Blacks 
because they vote and unresponsive to the poor because they do not.77 The data 
provide some support for this view. Specifically, the proportion of individuals 
below the poverty line that reported voting in presidential elections has 
declined from above fifty percent in 1964 to less than forty percent in 2004, 
while the proportion of Blacks that reported voting has remained relatively 
stable at just below sixty percent since the 1968 presidential election.78 
 
 72. Paul D. Schumaker & Russell W. Getter, Responsiveness Bias in 51 American Communities, 21 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 257 (1977). 
 73. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 53, at 266 (“[O]nce the extraordinary political conditions 
that had spurred the Great Society programs receded, the political influence temporarily exercised by 
the minority poor in American politics evaporated.”). 
 74. Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 POL. SCI. Q. 778, 788 (2005). 
 75. BARTELS, supra note 5, at 253–54. 
 76. Id. at 254. 
 77. See supra text and accompanying notes 11 and 12. 
 78. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004, 
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/cps2004.html; U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, VOTER PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL ELECTION: NOVEMBER 1964, available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/p20-143.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). These 
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However, the alternative account—that lack of responsiveness is caused by 
particular defects in the two-party system that create incentives to exclude 
particular groups—can also explain the stable participation of southern Blacks 
and the decline in turnout amongst the poor over the past forty years.79 
Specifically, the data provide support for the view that changes to democratic 
organizational structures mandated by the Constitution, and later the VRA, 
created incentives for political parties to be responsive to southern Blacks.80 
These changes included the invalidation of certain multimember districts under 
the Equal Protection Clause and the mandated creation of majority-minority 
districts under the VRA.81 At the same time, no such changes in organizational 
structures have been specifically targeted towards creating incentives for 
responsiveness to the interests of the poor.  
It is difficult to disentangle the effect of each of these sources on the 
increase in party responsiveness to southern Blacks and the decline in 
responsiveness to the poor. Nonetheless it seems relatively uncontroversial to 
assume that the divergence in responsiveness to these two groups are driven by 
both the changes in participation rates of these groups and defects in the 
incentive structures of the two-party system. To the extent that political parties’ 
lack of responsiveness is caused by defects in the political process, such 
nonresponsiveness raises issues of a constitutional dimension. In particular, the 
Court has established a much overlooked standard under the Equal Protection 
Clause to ensure representative government through “minimum 
responsiveness” by political parties to groups with shared interests. 
This constitutional protection is especially important for a marginalized 
group like the poor because of the lack of a foreseeable social movement that 
will contribute to shifts in national politics analogous to the civil rights 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s and the changes it brought to southern 
politics for Blacks. In addition, it is unlikely that the political parties will 
voluntarily change, through legislation, the organizational structures of the two-
party system in a manner responsive to the poor. Such responsive legislation to 
the poor presupposes a level of responsiveness that is nonexistent. 
 
numbers exceed the percentage of persons that actually voted, but there is no evidence that 
misreporting has varied over time. See, e.g., Lee Sigelman, The Nonvoting Voter in Voting Research, 26 
J. POL. 47, 54–55 (1981). 
 79. Studies have generally shown that particular districting arrangements, such as majority-
minority districts in which a particular minority racial group constitutes a majority of voters, has led to 
an increase in responsiveness by political officials and greater participation by Blacks and Latinos in 
those districts as compared to non-majority–minority districts. See e.g., CLAUDINE GAY, THE EFFECT 
OF MINORITY DISTRICTS AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN 
CALIFORNIA 55–57 (2001); Matt A. Barreto et al., The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts 
on Latino Turnout, 98 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 74 (2004); but see Kimball Brace et al., Minority 
Turnout and the Creation of Majority-Minority Districts, 23 AM. POL. Q. 190, 201 (1995) (finding that 
the creation of majority–minority districts “does not invariably lead to greater participation”). 
 80. See supra note 79. 
 81. See infra IV. 
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IV 
THE MINIMUM RESPONSIVENESS STANDARD 
Chief Justice Earl Warren once described the legislative-reapportionment 
cases as his most important contribution to the law.82 That is rather remarkable 
considering that he was the author of Brown v. Board of Education,83 which 
declared school segregation unconstitutional, and that he was an important 
contributor to the criminal-procedure revolution that established an array of 
constitutional protections for criminal defendants.84 Of course, when assessing 
the effect of the reapportionment cases on the redistricting practices of every 
state in the Union, Chief Justice Warren’s description seems not only more 
defensible but understated.  
What has been overlooked by many scholars is that these cases stand for 
more than the requirement that states maintain equal-population legislative 
districts; the cases established as well a constitutional principle of fair 
representation premised on majority rule. This principle would later 
incorporate a requirement of minimum responsiveness to politically 
marginalized groups. In light of the states’ consistent compliance with the 
equal-population principle over the last two redistricting cycles, this latter, 
minimum responsiveness requirement is the more relevant constitutional 
concern given the prevalence of politically marginalized groups like southern 
Blacks and the poor. 
The “reapportionment revolution” began in 1962 when the Supreme Court 
entered what had previously been described as the “political thicket.”85 In the 
absence of constitutional constraints, states maintained malapportioned districts 
to protect incumbents and empower minority voters, particularly rural voters.86 
Generally, states would either draw districts in accordance with county lines or 
maintain systems of voting that gave geographical units equal voting power 
irrespective of differences in population.87 The growing movement of people to 
urban centers over the course of the twentieth century increased the differences 
in population between counties and led to vastly unequal weighting of urban 
and rural votes in many states.88 In light of the examples of gross 
malapportionment of districts, the Court in Baker v. Carr89 held that the 
 
 82. MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 1953–1969 109 (2005). 
 83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 84. For a description of the most important criminal-procedure cases of the Warren Court era, see 
YALE KASIMAR, THE WARREN COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE WARREN COURT, A 
RETROSPECTIVE 116–58 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996). 
 85. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555 (1946). It could be argued that the Supreme Court 
had already entered the political thicket two years earlier in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 
(1960), in which it held a redistricting arrangement that disenfranchised Blacks in Tuskegee, Alabama, 
unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
 86. Auerbach, supra note 9, at 68–70. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause established a constitutional 
constraint on the establishment and maintenance of these districts. Over the 
next three terms the Court would identify the constraint and its theoretical 
basis. 
In Gray v. Sanders, the Court, addressing a party primary voting system, 
held that the Equal Protection Clause required one person, one vote.90 In other 
words, all individuals regardless of race, sex, occupation, income, residence or 
any other characteristic must have an equally weighted vote;91 therefore, all 
geographical voting units had to be comprised of an equal number of 
individuals. The Court would later apply this one person, one vote standard to 
federal congressional districts under Article I, § 2 of the Constitution.92 In these 
early cases, the Court grounded the one person, one vote standard on the idea 
of participatory equality and the theory derived from prior case law that the 
right to vote is preservative of all other rights.93 Much as the denial of the right 
to vote makes the exercise of other rights illusory, the Court determined that 
the unequal weighting of votes through malapportioned districts would abridge 
the right to vote and concomitantly impair other rights.94 
The Court further developed the theoretical justification for one person, 
one vote in Reynolds v. Sims, in which it held malapportioned state legislative 
districts unconstitutional because they undermined representative government 
by “sanction[ing] minority control of state legislative bodies” and impeding 
government responsiveness to “the popular will.”95 Representative government, 
the Court insisted, required majority rule and responsiveness to the majority of 
the electorate.96 Fair representation in accordance with majority rule therefore 
required the “opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of 
state legislators.”97 As for minority groups, such as rural voters, that states 
sought to protect through malapportioned districts, the Court explained that 
“[o]ur constitutional system amply provides for the protection of minorities by 
means other than giving them majority control of state legislatures.”98 
Justice Potter Stewart, unsatisfied with the Court’s association of 
representative government with majority rule, dissented and provided an 
alternative theory of representative government. For Justice Stewart, 
 
 90. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
 91. Id. at 379. 
 92. Specifically in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964), the Court explained that the phrase 
“by the People of the several States” as stated in Art. I, § 2, required that “one man’s vote in a 
congressional election [be] worth as much as another’s.”  
 93. Id. at 17. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (explaining that voting is 
regarded as “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”). 
 94. Id. at 17–18. 
 95. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
 96. Id. (“In a society grounded on representative government, it would seem reasonable that a 
majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State’s legislators.”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 566. 
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representative government involved “a process of accommodating group 
interests through democratic institutional arrangements.”99 The function of 
government, therefore, is “to channel the numerous opinions, interests, and 
abilities of the people of a State into the making of the State’s public policy.”100 
In accordance with this theory, legislative apportionment should not be focused 
on ensuring equally populous legislative districts, but rather on safeguarding 
“effective representation in the State’s legislature, in cooperation with other 
organs of political power, of the various groups and interests making up the 
electorate.”101 Fair representation, therefore, meant responsiveness in the form 
of fair consideration of the views of the “medley of component voices” 
representing the many diverse interests that make up society.102 
Although initially expressed only in dissent, Justice Stewart’s notion of 
representative government would soon be incorporated, in limited form, into 
the Court’s fair representation principle. In the often overlooked case of 
Fortson v. Dorsey,103 decided a year after Reynolds, voters challenged 
multimember districts as contrary to one person, one vote. Multimember 
districts are districts in which constituents elect multiple representatives to a 
legislative body. In order to be consistent with one person, one vote, 
multimember districts must be proportionally larger in terms of population than 
a single-member district. In other words, a multimember district in which 
constituents elect two representatives must be twice as large in terms of 
population as a single-member district. The multimember districts in Fortson 
met the proportionality requirement;104 nonetheless, voters challenged the 
district because it had the potential, because of its size, to nullify the 
preferences of a minority group of voters.105 
According to the fair-representation-as-majority-rule principle espoused in 
Reynolds, the fact that a districting arrangement nullified the preferences of a 
minority subset of voters would seem irrelevant since there are ostensibly other 
constitutional means of protecting minorities. Nonetheless, instead of simply 
denying the claim, the Court announced in dicta that, while it had not been 
 
 99. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 751. Other commentators writing at the time were also critical of the Reynolds majority 
narrow notion of fair representation as majority rule as opposed to fair representation as the inclusion 
of all interests in the political process. See Auerbach, supra note 9, at 51; Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: 
Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252, 277. Reynolds, however, was equivocal in its 
invocation of majority rule as the underlying rationale for one-person, one-vote. The Court was 
concerned that Alabama’s malapportionment “den[ied] majority rights in a way that far surpasses any 
possible denial of minority rights that might otherwise be thought to result.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565. 
Thus, majority rule did not appear to be the Court’s sole measure of “fair and effective” representation. 
Rather, Alabama had overweighted minority interests in a manner that was not “relevant to the 
permissible purposes of legislative apportionment.” Id. 
 103. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). 
 104. Id. at 437. 
 105. Id. 
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proven in the case, “[i]t might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-
member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a 
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of 
racial or political elements of the voting population.”106 The next year, the Court 
would intimate in another case that apportionment schemes other than 
multimember districts could also operate to have this effect.107  
Despite the establishment of a standard that seemed to open the door for 
some limited requirement of group-based responsiveness, the meaning of this 
ambiguous standard would not be made clear for another eight years.  Part of 
the confusion with the new standard and why it would lie dormant had to do 
with the missing component in the Court’s development of the fair 
representation principle—political parties.108 The individualist, fair-
representation principle based on majority rule that was developed in Reynolds 
seems to imagine a democracy comprised of atomistic parts that vote in a 
manner that produces a majority that must be respected and a minority that is 
irrelevant. The more group-based, fair representation principle described by 
Justice Stewart, on the other hand, seemed to imagine a representative 
government comprised of an infinite number of interest groups that must be 
accommodated directly in the governing apparatus. Both of these models of 
representative government are undertheorized because they omit political 
parties, which are instrumental to ensuring responsiveness both to the majority 
and to the varied group interests that comprise society, but which also have the 
capacity to exclude groups from the political process. 
In two cases decided in the early 1970s, the Court established a minimum 
responsiveness standard reliant on the ambiguous dicta in Fortson that 
incorporated a pivotal role for political parties. The standard formulated was 
one of minimum responsiveness because it did not require that governments 
enact public policy favorable to particular group interests or that groups be 
guaranteed the election of candidates responsive to their interests.  It merely 
required that groups have their interests considered by one or both of the 
parties so as to ensure that they are part of the bargaining and compromise of 
the political process.109  
In Whitcomb v. Chavis,110 residents of a ghetto area in Marion County, 
Indiana, complained that the multimember districting arrangement diluted their 
voting strength. The residents described themselves as a group of poor, black 
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 107. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966). 
 108. See William P. Irwin, Representation and Election: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 67 
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ROSS II SMITH 5/1/2010 10:33:15 AM 
216 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:197 
individuals that have distinctive interests in “urban renewal and rehabilitation, 
health care, employment training and opportunities, welfare and relief of the 
poor, law enforcement, quality of education, and antidiscrimination measures” 
that were underrepresented in the political process.111 As evidence of the 
underrepresentation of their interests, they cited the fact that dis-
proportionately few of the legislators elected from 1960 to 1968 had been 
residents of the ghetto.112 
The Court rejected this proxy for responsiveness and held that the ghetto 
residents had been fairly represented in the political process on the basis of 
three factors. First, the political process was open because poor Blacks were 
able “to register or vote, to choose the political party they desired to support, to 
participate in its affairs or to be equally represented on those occasions when 
legislative candidates were chosen.”113 Second, there was no evidence that the 
political parties were unresponsive to this particular group, noting that the 
ghetto residents had failed to produce evidence demonstrating “that inhabitants 
of the ghetto were regularly excluded from the slates of both parties, thus 
denying them the chance of occupying legislative seats.”114 Finally, the Court 
relied on historical contextual factors. It inferred, probably on the basis of its 
support for the war on poverty during the 1960s, that the Democratic Party was 
responsive to the interests of ghetto residents.115 The Court therefore 
determined that the ghetto residents would not have any “justifiable complaints 
about representation” if Democrats, as opposed to Republicans, had won four 
of the five elections from 1960 to 1968.116 It concluded that the “canceling out” 
of voting strength that the ghetto residents complained about was not based on 
a “built-in bias against poor Negroes” but instead seemed to be “a mere 
euphemism for political defeat at the polls.”117 
In the second case, White v. Regester,118 the Court for the first time found a 
constitutional violation of the minimum responsiveness standard. In this case, 
members of the black community in Dallas County, Texas, challenged the 
multimember districting scheme as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
As in Whitcomb, the Court focused on the openness and responsiveness of the 
party system. This time, it found that the party system excluded Blacks and 
their interests from the political process and invalidated the districting 
arrangement. Looking to nearly identical factors as it did in Whitcomb, the 
Court in White first cited the district court’s findings that members of the black 
community were not able to participate in the Democratic Party’s affairs, 
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concluding that they had been “effectively excluded from participation in the 
Democratic Party primary selection process.”119 In addition, the evidence that 
only two Blacks had been slated since Reconstruction by the Dallas Committee 
for Responsible Government (DCRG), a White-dominated organization that 
controlled the Democratic Party’s slating process, demonstrated to the Court 
that Blacks were not equally represented on those occasions in which 
candidates were chosen.120  
Second, the Court relied on evidence that the Democratic Party was 
unresponsive to black interests because the party “did not need the support of 
the Negro community to win elections in the county and it did not therefore 
exhibit good-faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of 
the Negro community.”121 Finally, it looked to historical context and the use by 
the DCRG of racist campaign tactics to defeat the black communities’ 
candidates of choice in previous elections.122 The Court concluded on the basis 
of this evidence that Blacks in Dallas County had “less opportunity than did 
other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect 
legislators of their choice.”123 
As shown by Whitcomb and White, the Court in its development of a 
minimum responsiveness standard focused on three factors: the openness of the 
parties to the membership of the particular group, the openness of the parties to 
putting forward candidates responsive to the group, and the prior 
responsiveness of at least one of the political parties to the group’s interests.124 
The constitutional requirement of minimum responsiveness did not mandate 
that the group’s party or candidate win a certain number of seats in elections.125 
In fact, the Court first explained in Whitcomb that there was no requirement 
that the group’s party or candidate of choice win any election;126 it then 
reiterated in White that it is not enough that a group “has not had legislative 
seats in proportion to its voting potential.”127 The minimum responsiveness 
standard required only that members of minority groups have an opportunity to 
participate and elect a legislator of their choice, with a key determinant being 
that at least one of the parties be responsive to the group’s interests. 
Congress ultimately expanded the minimum responsiveness standard 
through its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in its 
reauthorization of the VRA in 1982. Adopting the language of White, Congress 
amended Section 2 of the VRA to prohibit election laws that result in 
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discrimination on account of race, which can be proven by showing that “the 
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of [racial or 
language minority groups] in that its members have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.”128 The Section 2 standard would also be used to 
determine whether changes in election laws by southern jurisdictions would be 
approved by the Attorney General of the United States under Section 5 of the 
Act.129  
The application of the minimum responsiveness standard through the 
vehicle of the VRA has assured not only minimum responsiveness in southern 
jurisdictions that have historically excluded racial minorities from the political 
process, but also nearly proportionate representation in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and several state legislatures in southern jurisdictions through 
the Department of Justice’s aggressive enforcement of the Act.130 The minimum-
responsive standard as established in the Act has thus emerged as another 
important part of the story of increasing responsiveness by the southern 
Democratic Party to black interests.131 
In spite of the focus of the minimum responsiveness standard on ensuring 
representative government, many scholars view the standard as merely part of 
Equal Protection antidiscrimination doctrine.132 Consistent with this doctrine, 
only districting arrangements that harm suspect classes, including racial and 
ethnic minorities, are entitled to the level of scrutiny that would generally 
invalidate practices that exclude groups from the political process. Since the 
poor are not a suspect class,133 the standard would seem to offer limited 
protection for members of this group. But an examination of the evolution of 
the minimum responsiveness standard reveals that it is not about ensuring that 
officials do not discriminate against members of a particular group, but instead 
about addressing defects in representative government. 
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As Justice Stewart explained in the vote dilution case, City of Mobile v. 
Bolden, “the focus in [these] cases has been on the lack of representation [that] 
multimember districts afford various elements of the voting population in a 
system of representative legislative democracy.”134 Concurring in judgment in 
the same case, Justice Stevens reasoned that “there is no national interest in 
creating an incentive to define political groups by racial characteristics. But if 
the Constitution were interpreted to give more favorable treatment to a racial 
minority alleging an unconstitutional impairment of its political strength than it 
gives to other identifiable groups making the same claim, such an incentive 
would inevitably result.”135 
Though sometimes couching vote dilution claims in the language of 
discrimination, the Court has not distinguished between groups such that those 
considered suspect classes, like racial minorities, are deemed entitled to more 
protection than other groups; instead, it has identified in the minimum 
responsiveness standard a requirement to protect racial, ethnic, economic, and 
political groups equally by ensuring inclusion through an opportunity to 
participate in the political process and elect a candidate of choice.136 In fact, in 
the most recent case in which the Court addressed a constitutional vote dilution 
claim, Davis v. Bandemer, it described a minimum responsiveness standard 
focused more on ensuring an open democratic process than on finding 
discriminatory conduct.137 Specifically, Justice White, writing for a plurality, 
explained that “[t]he question is whether a particular group has been 
unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political 
process” as measured by “the opportunity of members of the group to 
participate in party deliberations in the slating and nomination of candidates, 
their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their chance to directly 
influence the election returns and to secure the attention of the winning 
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candidate.”138 As a law-of-democracy doctrine, the minimum responsiveness 
standard is therefore obviously much more protective of groups, particularly 




The constitutional minimum responsiveness standard has created 
opportunities for the inclusion of groups, such as southern Blacks, who had 
been historically excluded from the political process. To the extent that 
empirical studies show that neither the Democratic nor the Republican Party 
take into account the interests of the poor when governing, the minimum 
responsiveness standard is directly applicable; however, any challenge to 
districting arrangements requires a localized appraisal of party openness and 
responsiveness.139 Specifically, such challenge would require an assessment of 
the openness of the party process to the participation of the poor in terms of 
party membership, putting forward candidates responsive to the poor, and the 
history of the local party’s responsiveness to the interests of the poor. 
In addition, an assessment of the applicability of the minimum 
responsiveness standard requires an examination of the extent to which the 
poor have shared interests. It has been assumed throughout this article that the 
poor, because of their shared economic status, have shared interest; however, 
the applicability of the standard depends on proof of this assumption. 
But assuming that districting arrangements result in the exclusion of the 
poor and their interests from the political process, it is necessary to identify the 
proper mechanisms for ensuring a more inclusive and responsive party system 
and government. The solution applied to southern Blacks under the VRA has 
been mandating the establishment and maintenance of majority–minority 
districts that ensure that this minority group has the opportunity to participate 
in the political process and elect candidates responsive to its interests. This 
structural approach seeks to change the electoral incentives of party actors by 
shifting black voters from the periphery to the median in certain districts.140 
Evidence seems to show that this approach has been successful; party 
candidates in these districts have had no choice but to appeal to, and be 
responsive to, the interests of black constituents in order to win elections. 
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However, we should be cautious about applying a remedy that seems successful 
for southern Blacks to the poor prior to addressing the viability of such an 
approach for the poor. For now, it is enough to identify the problem of the 
excluded poor and to identify a potential constitutional solution. As long as the 
poor remain excluded, our government will not be truly representative and the 
ideal of Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny will remain unfulfilled. 
 
